The strikes also took out several modern air defense and radar systems, essentially ending Russia’s dominance of the sea and air and returning a key piece of land to Kyiv’s control. Not only is the cruiser Moskva sitting at the bottom of the Black Sea, but days of Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on the Russian-occupied Snake Island in May and June damaged or destroyed several smaller landing and transport ships the Russians had docked on the strategic island 22 miles off Ukraine’s southwest coast. This person, like others quoted in this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity to candidly discuss the war. “They broke through the air defense and were able to sink the target,” Turchynov said.īoth on land and at sea, “Russian forces are much more vulnerable than they thought they were,” before the war, a senior Defense Department official told reporters this month. Ukraine took that as a lesson, firing two missiles simultaneously when attacking the Moskva. But Russia was able to shoot down the second missile targeting the ship because of the time between launches. Turchynov said a Neptune missile also struck the frigate Admiral Essen in April. “We congratulated each other on the fact that this is a very serious result.” Korostylev was key to the Neptune program’s development. “An hour after the cruiser was hit, I exchanged pleasantries with Oleg Korostylev, the general designer of the Ukrainian design bureau Luch,” he said in an interview from the southern frontline, where he is deployed as an officer. Oleksandr Turchynov, the former acting president of Ukraine and former secretary of the country’s National Security and Defense Council who jump-started the Neptune project, told POLITICO that he was proud of the missile. Ukraine’s domestically developed Neptune anti-ship missile, which sank the Moskva, and Harpoon missiles donated by Denmark that sank a Russian resupply ship this spring, have forced the fleet to stay well offshore, and out of the fight, for months. Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program for the Virginia-based think tank CNA has demonstrated a lack of seriousness in how the fleet has prepared, positioned itself and conducted operations given the threat of Ukrainian resistance.” The string of military disasters led to the firing of the fleet’s commander, Adm. Since the spring, the Black Sea Fleet’s problems have added up, the result of poor leadership, aging equipment, and a hubris the Ukrainians have been only too happy to exploit. While Russian submarines do fire into Ukraine from time to time, the fleet hasn’t lived up to the expectations set at the start of the war and has settled into what amounts to a defensive crouch either in port or well offshore to avoid Ukrainian attack. The Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk, is by far the Kremlin’s largest and most modern force, and had sent some of its own vessels to help just before the Russian invasion.īut the Crimea-based fleet was expected to play a large role in holding Ukrainian forces in the south to defend against an expected amphibious assault that never came, while shoring up the occupied peninsula. While the Black Sea Fleet has been strong enough to hold the small Ukrainian navy at bay, it has never been the pride of the Russian navy. Since those early days, however, Kyiv has seized the initiative as missile strikes and mysterious explosions have wreaked havoc on the Russian fleet, sinking several vessels - including its flagship cruiser the Moskva - and devastating its Crimea-based air wing in a dramatic attack this month.
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